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STATE ACTION AND STATUTORY LIENS IN
ARKANSAS - A REPLY TO PROFESSOR NICKLES
Earl M. Maltz*
In an article in the summer, 1978 issue of the ARKANSAS LAW
REv IEW, Professor Steve Nickles argues that certain Arkansas stat-
utes which grant liens to specific classes of creditors violate the
United States Constitution.' His contention is that because of a lack
of procedural safeguards, the statutory imposition or recognition of
such a lien is a taking of the debtor's property without due process
of law and therefore violates the fourteenth amendment. Following
his lead, a number of lower courts in Arkansas have ruled that
Arkansas' mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes are unconsti-
tutional.'
This article will argue that Professor Nickles and the lower
state courts are wrong on this issue. The focus of the article will be
rather narrow. No contention will be made that the imposition of
such a lien does not deprive a debtor of a property interest within
the meaning of the Constitution; on this point Professor Nickles'
argument is persuasive.3 Nor will there be any extended discussion
of the type of process which is due the debtor assuming that the
fourteenth amendment does constrain the imposition of the liens.4
Instead, the discussion will center on the question of whether the
acquisition of statutory liens by creditors and constitutes "state
action"- a prerequisite for the applicability of any of the protec-
tions of the fourteenth amendment.'
* B.A. Northwestern University 1972, J.D. Harvard 1975. Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Arkansas at Little Rock. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
the other members of the UALR faculty, with special thanks to Ellen Brantley.
1. Nickles, Creditors' Provisional Remedies and Debtors'Due Process Rights: Statutory
Liens in Arkansas, 32 ARK. L. REV. 185 (1978) hereinafter cited as Nickles.
2. Miesner v. Robinson, No. CTV-75-103 (Benton County Cir. Ct. 1978); Wickes v.
Cook, No. E78-520 (Craighead County Ch. Dec. 12, 1978); United Energy Savers, Inc. v.
Romontio, No. 78-3549 (Pulaski County Ch. Jan 29, 1979). The Wickes case has been ap-
pealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
3. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 192-97. See also Roundhouse Constr. Corp. v. Telesco
Masons Supply Co., 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778, vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975),
reaffirmed, 170 Conn. 155, 365 A.2d 393, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889 (1976); Barry Properties,
Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976). But see, e.g., Spielman-
Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973) (three-judge court) (per curiam),
aff'd without opinion, 417 U.S. 901 (1974); Connolly Dev. Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Merced
County, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976).
4. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 199. But see Note 64, infra.
5. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978);Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 17-18 (1883).
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I. POSSESSORY LIENS - OR "I KNOW WHAT THE COURT
SAID IT MEANT, BUT WHAT IT REALLY MEANT WAS..."
The leading case dealing with the question of state action in the
context of a statutorily-created possessory lien is Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks.8 There the Court considered the constitutionality of sections
7-209 and 7-210 of the Uniform Commercial Code,7 which provide
that a warehouseman has a lien against a bailor for storage and
related charges on goods covered by a warehouse receipt, and that
this lien may be enforced by the warehouseman through the sale of
the covered goods without resort to judicial process." The claim of
the debtor in Flagg Brothers was that consummating such a sale
without granting a prior hearing to the bailor constituted a depriva-
tion of property without due process of law. The threshold question
was whether the sale in fact constituted state action within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Those challenging the law
relied primarily on the argument that the sales should be considered
governmental action because the state had delegated to the ware-
housemen the "traditional sovereign function" of resolving disputes
between debtors and creditors.'
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, as well as the con-
tention that the fourteenth amendment applied because the state
had "authorized and encouraged" the sale under section 7-210."0
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion distinguished cases dealing
with the conduct of elections" and control of public streets" as
involving functions traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.
By contrast, the creditors and debtors were seen as having a "far
wider number of choices" for resolving their disputes, with resort to
the government being only one of these choices.' 3 Thus, the Court
concluded that no state action was involved in the sale and therefore
that there could have been no violation of the due process clause in
the sale of the goods.
On its face, Flagg Brothers would appear to undermine any due
process attacks on possessory liens - unless, of course, the lien-
6. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
7. Codified in Arkansas at Ark. Stat. Ann § 85-7-209 (Cum. Supp. 1977) and ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 85-7-210 (Add. 1961).
8. See id.
9. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978).
10. See id. at 164-66.
11. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
12. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
13. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158-62 (1978).
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holder comes into court to enforce his lien or employs some other
state officer in its enforcement. Nonetheless, Professor Nickles
argues that the Flagg Brothers rationale is inapplicable to vehicle
repairmen's liens in Arkansas.'4 His argument revolves around the
contention that references in the opinion to the availability of dam-
age and replevin remedies in Flagg Brothers, in addition to similar
references to the possibility of negotiated waivers of the lien or of
the right to sale, belie any attempt to characterize the case as rest-
ing on the question of whether the state has traditionally had the
exclusive right to perform the function at issue;" rather, he suggests,
the analysis must focus on "the extent of the authorization (or dele-
gation) and not simply with the degree to which the function's exer-
cise has traditionally been associated only with the state."" But,
Professor Nickles argues, application of this formulation necessarily
involves an analysis of the probable efficacy of each of the various
options available to the debtors." He further contends that a dam-
age remedy is likely to be at best of limited efficacy and that debtors
will generally have insufficient bargaining leverage to obtain waiv-
ers from repairmen. Thus he concludes that replevin is the debtor's
only effective recourse.' 8 But he further argues that replevin is una-
vailable in Arkansas against one claiming to hold under a repair-
men's lien," and therefore, whatever the appropriate result in New
York where replevin is available, state action analysis leads to the
conclusion that consitutional due process requirements are impli-
cated where a repairman claims a lien in Arkansas. 2
Initially, Professor Nickles' argument that replevin is not avail-
able in Arkansas in cases dealing with repairmen's liens is over-
stated at best. For support of this position, he relies on Smith v.
Checker Cab Co. ' Checker Cab was a suit by a taxicab company
for replevin of an automobile from a garage. In defense, the garage
argued that it held the automobile pursuant to a lien for payment
14. Nickles, supra note 1, at 240-47. Flagg Brothers was decided after the main portion
of the Nickles article had been sent to press. However, he prepared an "Addendum" in which
he argues that notwithstanding the Flagg Brothers decision, state action should be found in
cases dealing with Arkansas' vehicle repairmen's lien statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-404
(1971).
15. Nickles, supra note 1, at 243.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 244.
18. Id. at 244-46.
19. Id. at 246. See id. at 224.
20. Id. at 247.
21. 208 Ark. 99, 184 S.W.2d 901 (1945). See Nickles, supra note 1, at 224 n. 164.
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for repairs which the taxicab company had requested to be made."
The taxicab company contended that no such repairs had been
made. A jury found that labor valued at $350 had in fact been
performed, 23 and the court held that replevin was inappropriate
because no tender of payment for the services had ever been made.24
Professor Nickles argues that Checker Cab effectively leaves a
debtor in Arkansas without a means to have a disputed bill adjudi-
cated in a replevin proceeding. 5 But in Checker Cab the disputed
claim was adjudicated, with the jury finding that the repairman was
owed $350. Further, the case is clearly limited to a situation where
no payment has been tendered, with the court clearly implying that
if payment had been offered, then the debtor would have been enti-
tled to replevin. 21 There is language in the opinion from which it
might be inferred that the owner of the taxicab would have had to
tender the entire amount claimed by the repairman.27 But such a
result would be contrary to the basic concept of the lien statutes,
as Professor Nickles seems to concede. 2 A repairman only has a lien
"for the sums of money due" for the work which he has done2 -
an amount which may well differ from the amount claimed by the
repairman. Once the amount due is tendered, the lien is extin-
guished, the repairman no longer has any right in the goods and the
owner therefore has a right to immediate possession under a writ of
replevin.
Thus, if there is a dispute over what amount is due, the debtor
could petition for a writ of replevin, claiming that he had tendered
the amount due. The repairman would then answer that the amount
tendered was less than the amount due. Pursuant to the Arkansas
statutes, the court would then hold an evidentiary hearing and if
the debtor makes a prima facie showing that he has tendered the
proper amount, he will be awarded possession pending final disposi-
tion 30 (assuming, of course, that other procedural prerequisites are
satisfied). It is difficult to see precisely what protections that Profes-
sor Nickles envisions which are not available in Arkansas."
22. Smith v. Checker Cab Co., 208 Ark. 99, 100, 184 S.W.2d 901 (1945).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 101, 184 S.W.2d at 902.
25. Nickles, supra note 1, at 224.
26. See Smith v. Checker Cab Co., 208 Ark. 99, 101, 184 S.W.2d 901, 902 (1945).
27. See id. (stating that judgment was "without prejudice to the right to maintain
another action if and when the bill for repairs has been paid or tendered") (emphasis added).
28. See Nickles, supra note 1 at 225 n. 166.
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-404 (1971) (emphasis added).
30. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2121 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
31. This is not to suggest that there are no differences at all between the procedural
[Vol. 2:357
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In a sense, the question of the extent to which a replevin remedy
is available to debtors in Arkansas is almost a side issue. Far more
important is Professor Nickles' general proposition that the applica-
bility of Flagg Brothers in situations involving possessory liens will
depend upon the exact nature of the local remedies available.2 This
contention seems to directly contradict the statement of the Flagg
Brothers Court that, "[w]hatever the particular remedies available
under New York law, we do not consider a more detailed description
of them necessary to our conclusion that the settlement of disputes
between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive pub-
lic function.
'3
Professor Nickles recognizes that this language suggests that
state action analysis does not depend on the extent to which avail-
able remedies might give effective protection to the debtor's inter-
est. 4 He avoids the problem by finding this statement in conflict
with the Court's earlier reference to the damage and replevin reme-
dies - both of which require access to state courts - as viable
alternatives to the debtor's passively acquiescing in the sale of his
goods. 35 Having discovered such a conflict, he feels free to resolve it
by arguing that the decision in Flagg Brothers did in fact depend
upon the details of the available remedial scheme - essentially
asserting that the above-quoted passage has no meaning.
Initially, the juxtaposition of the quoted statement and the
references to the New York remedies, with the former immediately
following the latter, seems to suggest that Justice Rehnquist antici-
pated that some might make just such an argument as that put
forward by Professor Nickles and was seeking to eliminate any pos-
sibility that the Flagg Brothers opinion would be so narrowly con-
strued. But, in any event, there is no inevitable conflict between a
reference to some remedies on the one hand and an assertion of the
prerequisites for maintenance of a replevin action in New York and the requirements which
must be satisfied in order to obtain a similar remedy in Arkansas. For example, in New York,
it appears that no tender of payment is necessary in order for a debtor to reclaim property
held pursuant to a repairmen's lien. See Feldman v. Diak, 229 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
By contrast, Checker Cab clearly holds that such tender is a prerequisite to replevin in
Arkansas.
However, such procedural differences do not strengthen Professor Nickles' contention.
The gravamen of his argument is that replevin is essentially unavailable in Arkansas; the fact
that the remedy may be marginally more difficult to obtain than it would be in New York
does little to advance this position.
32. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 242.
33. 436 U.S. at 161 (footnote omitted).




irrelevance of the details of those remedies on the other. For while
the existence of any specific remedy is not relevant to the question
of state action under the Flagg Brothers approach, the existence of
some opportunity for the debtor to challenge the lawfulness of the
consummation of a sale-either before or after the sale actually
takes place-may be critical. If there is such a remedy, the only
decision which has been "delegated" to the lienholder is that of the
initial question of whether to sell or hold the goods; the state,
through the courts, still retains the ultimate authority to determine
whether the disposition of goods was in fact lawful. By contrast, if
no such remedy exists, then the state will have in effect delegated
the latter function-clearly one traditionally reserved exclusively to
the state-to the lienholder.
But if a debtor has a remedy, it makes little difference for these
purposes whether the form of the remedy is a replevin action, an
action for damages, or some other type of lawsuit. Whatever the
appropriate form of action, the state will not have granted to the
lienholder the power to make any binding determination of the law-
fulness or unlawfulness of the retention or sale of the goods; rather,
this power will be left in an arm of the government-the judiciary.
The fact that the debtor may be reluctant (for whatever reason) to
invoke the remedy provided by the government is irrelevant for
determining which sovereign functions, if any, have been delegated
to the lienholder. Conceptually it is impossible to see how any
debtor (or for that matter the entire class of debtors) can transfer a
sovereign prerogative from the state to the lienholders simply by
refusing to invoke a remedy which the state has provided. 31
Thus viewed, the portions of the Flagg Brothers opinion which
Professor Nickles finds to be in conflict can be seen as forming part
of a coherent pattern of analysis. Further, there are other clear
indications that the opinion is intended to be read broadly rather
than seen as based on the particular remedies available in New
36. Professor Nickles relies on Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1
(1978), as authority for the proposition that "most members of the Court also believe a
damages action is not a real choice for a debtor." Nickles, supra note 1, at 245. Craft dealt
with a termination of a customer's utility service by a utility company owned by a city; thus,
there was no problem in finding state action without resort to the sovereign function doctrine.
Compare Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), discussed in text at notes
40-44, infra. The discussion to which Professor Nickles refers, see Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19-21 and n.26, took place in the context of the Court's
discussion of what process is due - an area in which a balancing methodology is well-
established. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). There is no indication anywhere in Craft that a similar approach is
to be applied to the question of whether state action is present.
[Vol. 2:357
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York. For example, at one point the majority states that "[ojur
analysis requires no parsing of the difference between various com-
mercial liens and other remedies to support the conclusion that this
entire field of activity is outside the scope of [the sovereign function
doctrine.] ' 3 The opinion also suggests that "even if we were inc-
lined to extend the sovereign-function doctrine . . . the field of
private commercial transactions would be a particularly inappro-
priate area into which to expand it."' In the face of such clear
language, any attempt to limit the scope of the decision based on
the remedies available to the debtor in a given state can only be
based on an analytical framework fundamentally at odds with that
adopted by the Flagg Brothers Court.
II. NON-POSSESSORY LIENS
3
At any number of points during the majority opinion, the Flagg
Brothers Court evinced a strong generalized hostility to the prospect
of finding state action in cases dealing with the simple creation of
commercial liens.' 0 Nonetheless, the differences between the cir-
cumstances under which non-possessory liens are created are suffi-
ciently different from those surrounding possessory liens as to re-
quire separate analysis. Professor Nickles finds the differences suffi-
ciently significant that while engaging in extensive justifications for
the finding of state action in connection with possessory liens, he
feels secure with an almost casual reference to the problem in his
discussion of mechanics' and materialmen's liens.4'
One important distinction is in the precise theory under which
the state action issue is decided. In Flagg Brothers and the other
possessory lien cases, the primary contention is that the lienholder,
although essentially a private entity has in effect become the state
37. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 162 (1978) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 163.
39. Since the publication of the Nickles article, the laws governing mechanics' and
materialmen's liens in Arkansas have been amended to provide that certain liens may not
be obtained unless notice is first given to the landowner. See Act 741 of 1979. However, this
amendment does not render moot the issues discussed in the section of the article dealing
with non-possessory liens. First, although not entirely clear, the amendments seem to apply
only to liens based on the supplying of materials; there apparently has been no change in
the laws governing liens based on the value of labor performed. Further, many of the issues
discussed in the Nickles article are also relevant to liens which remain unaffected by the new
statute. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-301, 51-905 (1971).
40. See text at notes 36-38, supra.
41. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 192 n. 48, citing Connolly Dev. Inc. v. Superior Ct. of
Merced Cty., 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976); Barry Properties, Inc.
v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976).
19791
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by having been given the authority to perform a traditional sover-
eign function - the sequestration and sale of goods to satisfy a debt.
By contrast, when considering a non-possessory lien, no claim could
be made that a materialman or mechanic is performing a sovereign
function by entering into and completing a contract to work on any
given property.
Instead, in a case involving a mechanic's lien, the focus is on
the state's role in the creation of the interest at issue. In Flagg
Brothers, in the absence of any action at all by the state, the ware-
houseman could retain possession of the debtor's goods and sell
them; the warehouseman's lien statutes are simply a statutory em-
bodiment of the state's choice not to act. But where non-possessory
liens are involved, the lienholder will have no interest in or control
of the property unless that interest is created by state law.
At this stage it would be easy to fall into the semantic trap of
concluding that because action by the government ("state action")
establishes the right to deprive a person of property, then the depri-
vation itself must be subject to the strictures of the fourteenth
amendment. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co."2 makes clear,
however, that any such argument is untenable. There a privately-
owned utility company, holding a certificate of convenience from
the Pennsylvania Utility Commission and subject to extensive regu-
lation by that Commission, had discontinued a customer's electrical
service. 3 The customer claimed that this -constituted a deprivation
of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. 44 Apparently accepting the assumption that the utility
was required to obtain state approval for termination procedures,'
45
the Court nonetheless rejected the due process argument, conclud-
ing that the termination did not constitute state action. The major-
ity opinion argued that "[the utility's] exercise of the choice al-
lowed by state law where the initiative comes from it and not from
the State, does not make its action in doing so 'state action' for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."'"
Given cases such as Metropolitan Edison, it becomes critical to
42. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
43. Id. at 346-47.
44. Id. at 347-48.
45. At one point, the majority states that "it is less than clear under state law that the
utility was even required to file [the termination procedure provision] as part of its tariff or
that the Commission would have had the power to disapprove it." 419 U.S. at 355 (footnote
omitted). However, for the remainder of the opinion, the Court seemed to proceed on the
assumption that filing and approval was required. See id. at 356-59.
46. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (footnote omitted).
364 [Vol. 2:357
STATUTORY LIENS-REPLY
focus on the question of what part of the process of establishment
and enforcement of mechanics' and materialmen's liens is being
relied upon as constituting state action which deprives a person of
a property right. The Nickles article is not concerned with the proce-
dural requirements which must be satisfied by a tribunal or other
state body in adjudicating the question of whether a given claimed
lien actually exists under state law, or the type of notice and hearing
which must be granted to a property holder prior to sequestration
or sale of the property by a state official to satisfy the debt. State
action is concededly present at that stage, and the question of what
procedural requirements are mandated by the Constitution would
be determined by the principles established by such cases as
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,4" Fuentes v. Shevin,45 Mitchell
v. W. T. Grant Co.49 and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem.,
Inc 0 Instead, the Nickles article focuses on the pre-enforcement
stage - the time during which the lien claimant is taking the steps
which will be necessary to establish his claim if the matter should
ever be placed before a court."' If the necessary state action is to be
discovered at this point, it must be found in either the legislative
action defining statutorily the conditions under which mechanics
and materialmen are entitled to liens generally, or in the steps
which are taken in each individual case to establish the lien.
Any argument that state action may be found based upon the
statutory description of when a lien attaches is foreclosed by a foot-
note to Flagg Brothers. There one of the arguments made was that
state action was present because the warehouseman was statutorily
authorized to terminate the debtor's property interest by selling the
stored goods. 2 Responding to this contention, Justice Rehnquist
stated that
it is undoubtedly true, that... "respondents have a property in-
terest in the possessions that the warehouseman proposes to sell."
But that property interest is not a monolithic, abstract concept
hovering in the legal stratosphere. It is a bundle of rights in person-
alty, the metes and bounds of which are determined by the deci-
sional and statutory law of the State of New York. The validity of
47. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
48. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
49. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
50. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
51. See, e.g. Nickles, supra note 1, at 199-200 (discussing perfection requirement).
For a detailed description of the steps necessary to acquire and perfect a lien, see Nickles,
supra note 1, at 187-90.
52. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978).
1979]
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the property interest in these possessions which respondents pre-
viously acquired from some other private person depends on New
York law, and the manner in which that same property interest in
these same possessions may be lost or transferred to still another
private person likewise depends on New York Law. It would intol-
erably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our previous cases, the
notion of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment to hold
that the mere existence of a body of property law in a State,
whether decisional or statutory, itself amounted to "state action"
even though no state officials or state process were ever involved
in enforcing that body of law. 3
Mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes are nothing more than
a part of "the body of property law" of the state of Arkansas. Thus,
under the Flagg Brothers rationale, their mere enactment and exist-
ence cannot constitute state action.
The remaining possible source for a finding of state action lies
in the steps which must be taken to acquire each individual lien.
Certainly there is no warrant to find such action in the simple agree-
ment between the lien claimant and the owner (or his agent) to
perform work on the property to which the lien attaches. Such an
agreement is purely a matter of negotiation between two private
parties, typically with no state involvement whatsoever. Further
there is no requirement that this agreement grant a lien to the
contractor or materialmen; nothing in state law prevents the owner
from obtaining a waiver of lien rights prior to the initiation of any
work on the relevant property."
This leaves only the filing requirement5 5 as a potential concep-
tual basis upon which to ground a finding of state action. The argu-
ment would be that unlike the agreement between the contractor
and the owner, the filing process necessarily involves a state official
- under Arkansas law, the clerk of the local circuit court. 6 The
force of this argument is lessened considerably by language in Flagg
53. Id. at 160 n.10 (emphasis added). See also id. at 164-66.
54. People's Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Leslie Lumber Co., 183 Ark. 800, 38 S.W.2d 759
(1931).
In fairness, it should be noted that a property owner must take considerable care to insure
that all liens against his property which might arise from a given construction project have
been waived. Merely to obtain such a waiver from the contractor is insufficient; rather, the
owner must be certain that all materialmen who supply goods used in the project have notice
of this waiver. People's Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Leslie Lumber Co., 183 Ark. 800, 38 S.W.2d
759 (1931); Cost v. Newport Builders' Supply & Hardware Co., 85 Ark. 407, 108 S.W. 509
(1908).




Brothers which strongly suggests that performance of mere minis-
terial acts such as the recordation of liens by state employees does
not constitute governmental action within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment. 57 This position makes considerable sense in
terms of the policy considerations underlying the state action re-
quirement. The fourteenth amendment was intended to protect cer-
tain substantive interests against the type of coercive force which
the state can exert due to its monopoly on final dispute resolution
procedures and the right to use force to enforce its will.5" The mere
act of filing a lien claim does not implicate this coercive force in any
way; the clerk does not purport to pass on the validity of any such
claim but simply maintains a file through which interested persons
can see what claims private parties believe they have against any
given piece of property. Any final determination of the existence
and amount of the lien is left to the judicial proceedings which may
be instituted to enforce the lien.5'
But even if some states' recording procedures provided a suffi-
cient predicate for a finding of state action, such a finding would
be plainly inappropriate given the Arkansas statutes. Filing is not
necessary to create the lien; it is valid for 120 days without any
attempt to file. ° Further, even after that time, when filing is a
prerequisite to enforcement of the lien, no act is required of any
state official; the statutes only require that the lien claimant file his
lien with the clerk, rather than making recordation by the clerk a
prerequisite to enforcement.6 Moreover, while there is no case on
point regarding mechanics' liens, it seems highly probably that the
courts would follow the rule established for mortgages that improper
recordation does not affect the priority of the lien"2 - especially in
view of the fact that the statute granting mechanics' and material-
men's liens priority over subsequent encumberances makes no men-
tion at all of the recordation.1 Thus, all of the actions necessary to
fully establish the lien claimant's rights are taken by private parties
rather than governmental officials.
57. See 436 U.S. at 160-61 n.10 (by implication) (In Sniadach, Fuentes and Di-Chem,
fourteenth amendment protections attached "not because... a clerk issued a ministerial writ
out of the court, but because as a result of that writ the property of the debtor was seized
and impounded by the affirmative command of the law of Georgia." (emphasis added)).
58. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883).
59. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-607 to 622 (1971).
60. See Nickles, supra note 1 at 193 n.52, 199 n.78, and authorities cited therein.
61. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-613 (1971).
62. Oats v. Walls, 28 Ark. 244 (1873).
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-607 (1971).
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In short, although the issue is not quite as clear as in cases
dealing with possessory liens, proper analysis nonetheless leads to
the conclusion that there is not state action involved in the acquisi-
tion by private parties of mechanics' and materialmen's liens. Any
question of what notice and hearing would be required by the due
process clause in the event that state action was present is therefore
entirely moot."
Conclusion
This comment is not intended to express an opinion on the
fairness of the imposition of any of the liens imposed by the Arkan-
sas statutes. Certainly strong arguments can be made that some of
the liens impose inequitable burdens on property owners. But not
every unfair law is unconstitutional; in most cases, the responsibil-
ity for correcting such unfairness is left with the legislature. And it
is with the legislature that the responsibility for correcting any defi-
ciencies with the various Arkansas lien statutes lies. The General
Assembly should carefully weigh the competing arguments for and
against reform, unfettered by any imagined constitutional defects
in the current scheme.
64. A strong argument can be made that even prior to the amendments discussed at
note 39, supra, the existence of the statutes themselves provided notice sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the due process clause (even assuming that the requisite state action was
present). Certainly the statutes cannot be seen as so vague that the property owner is not
given warning of the consequences of his actions, see generally Note, The Void-for- Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). In the absence of such vague-
ness, the state is normally allowed to presume that a person is aware of the contents of the
statutes. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Cole v.
Railroad Retirement Bd., 289 F.2d 65, 68 (8th Cir. 1961).
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